The New York Times and other publications headline about the above report was that it blamed the Russians for this intel igence failure. This was not the case at al . The blame rests primarily on the Counter Intel igence FBI SA who handled the case. This FBI agent, perhaps a holdover from the Cold War, decided this was the Russians problem and
he was going to let it slide so that the Ruskies would get their come upins? My comments are in Red. RECEIPT OF INFORMATION FROM THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT In 2011, two years before the Boston Marathon bombings, Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva came to the attention of the FBI based on information received from the FSB. In March 2011, the FBI Legal Attaché (LEGAT) in Moscow received a memorandum in Russian from the FSB regarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. According to the English translation used by the FBI, the memorandum al eged that both were adherents of radical Islam, and that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was preparing to travel to Russia to join unspecified “bandit underground groups” in Dagestan and Chechnya and had considered changing his last name to “Tsarni.” The Russian authorities provided personal information about both Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, including their telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, and requested that the FBI provide the FSB with specific information about them, including possible travel by Tsarnaev to Russia. Importantly, the memorandum included two incorrect dates of birth (October 21, 1987 or 1988) for Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and the English translation used by the FBI transliterated their last names as Tsarnayev and Tsarnayeva, respectively. After reviewing a draft of the report, the FBI commented that there is no standard transliteration of names from Cyril ic to Roman characters. This was detailed information that was to be taken seriously. So what if the names were transliterated incorrectly? Any search they performed would display variations of the names. The FBI had the phone numbers, the email addresses for identification purposes. The phone numbers
should have told them that the information came from a telephone tap. Who cares if the birthdates were incorrect? There was plenty of identifying data. FBI was able to identify the subjects in a heartbeat. On March 9, 2011, the FBI Legal Attaché in Moscow sent a letter to the FSB acknowledging receipt of the information and requesting that it keep the FBI informed of any details it developed on Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. The FBI Legal Attaché also sent the translated memorandum to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and the FBI Boston Field Division with leads to both components “to take any investigative steps deemed appropriate and provide [LEGAT] Moscow with any information derived, for dissemination to the [FSB].” According to available information, the FBI Legal Attaché did not coordinate with or notify the CIA in March 2011 after receiving the lead information concerning Tsarnaev. In retrospect this was a mistake. The CIA took this threat much more seriously than the FBI and when it was apprised of the situation entered Tsarnaev in numerous data bases. OPENING AND CONDUCT OF THE FBI’S ASSESSMENT The Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force subsequently conducted an assessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev to determine whether he posed a threat to national security. The FBI Special Agent (CT Agent) who handled the assessment memorialized the steps he took in the assessment in an incident report maintained in the FBI’s eGuardian system, which is the FBI’s threat tracking and management system for counterterrorism assessments. So the FBI CT Agent felt there was a threat and downloaded the report
into the FBI’s threat tracking system. The Guardian or eGuardian system is first and foremost incident reporting system that standardizes existing reporting types. An incident is an occurrence or reporting of a suspicious activity, threat or event relating to terrorism. So at first the CT Agent believed that threat did exist. The CT Agent conducted database searches, reviewed references to Tsarnaev and his family in closed FBI counterterrorism cases, performed “drive-bys” of Tsarnaev’s residence, made an on-site visit to his former col ege, and interviewed Tsarnaev and his parents. Based on information from database searches, the CT Agent determined that Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s last name was spel ed “Tsarnaev,” and that his correct date of birth was October 21, 1986, information that differed from the lead memorandum from the FSB. During the assessment, the CT Agent asked a Customs and Border Patrol officer on the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force to create a (deleted) in TECS (the "Joint Terrorism Task Force TECS record"), which included the correct name and date of birth. TECS is a system used to, among other things provide advance notice of international travel and vet international travelers at airports and other ports of entry. TECS is an information-sharing platform, which al ows users to access different databases that may be maintained on the platform or accessed through the platform, and the name of a system of records that include temporary and permanent enforcement, inspection, and operational records relevant to the anti-terrorism and law enforcement mission of numerous other federal agencies that it supports. TECS not only provides a platform for interaction between these databases and defined TECS users, but also serves as a data repository to support law enforcement “lookouts,” border screening, and reporting.
What good is driving by someone’s residence going to do? And these were drive bys – plural. He made an “onsite visit to his former col ege” but never conducted interviews there as he did with Tsarnaev and his parents. He had info from the Ruskies that this man was a terrorist yet he conducted the investigation in such a way that would insure nothing would come up. Just self-serving interviews with the people mentioned by the FSB! Why would anyone think they would incriminate themselves? The CT Agent figured Caucasian Islamist separatists are Russia’s problem, so screw them. I keep this one on the outside so he can return to Russia and do his thing there. Who knows the ethnic background of this agent – he might have been Chechen. The DOJ OIG determined that the CT Agent did not take certain steps during the assessment, including contacting local law enforcement, visiting the mosque that Tsarnaev attended, and conducting interviews of Tsarnaev's wife, a former girlfriend he had been arrested for assaulting in 2009, or friends and associates. The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that he did not find sufficient derogatory information to justify taking these additional steps. Contacting local law enforcement might have helped make Tsarnaev a suspect in the kil ing of the Jewish pot dealers on September 11. Visiting the mosque is a good idea. See how devout a Muslim he is because Jihad real y is a pil ar of Islam. Questioning the wife would have done no good because she is a hard core Muslima who was in on the event from the start. Of course he did not find sufficient derogatory info because the steps he took in his investigation were slanted in the direction of proving innocence, not guilt so he could release this attack dog on the
Russians. The DOJ OIG also determined that the CT Agent did not attempt to elicit certain information during interviews of Tsarnaev and his parents, including information about Tsarnaev's plans to travel to Russia, changes in lifestyle, or knowledge of and sympathy for militant separatists in Chechnya and Dagestan. The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that he did not know why he did not ask about plans to travel to Russia (several lines deleted). The dude could not explain why he deliberately omitted the most important piece of info. The initial info concerned a trip to a global terrorist hotspot. FBI SA surely knows better. The deleted part has something to do with the agents background with the FBI. This could be a Muslim agent for al we know. Additional y, the DOJ OIG determined that the CT Agent did not use every relevant search term known or available at the time to query the databases that were searched, nor did he conduct searches of several major FBI systems, including certain telephone databases and databases that include information col ected under authority of the Foreign Intel igence Surveil ance Act (FISA). However, searches of FBI databases conducted at the direction of the DOJ OIG during this review produced little information beyond that identified by the CT Agent during the assessment, with the exception of additional travel-related data for Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. The agent failed to put the telephone number supplied by the Russians through a telephone data base. The FBI conducted these searches not the OIG however they produced “little information” some information which we wil never know what it is – with the exception of learning
that Zubeidat was returning to the “Islamic Caucus Emirate” which is significant. The FBI, through its Office of General Counsel, stated that it was not aware of any documents shared with state and local law enforcement prior to the bombings but that representatives of these agencies would have had access to the CT Agent's assessment in the Guardian system during this period. During the time period relevant to this review, Department of Homeland Security had detailed intel igence officers to each of the Massachusetts fusion centers in compliance with the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 124h(b)(5). The Department of Homeland Security OIG determined that the Department of Homeland Security intel igence officers at the fusion centers did not receive any documents or other information concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to the bombings, either from the FBI or from Department of Homeland Security personnel on the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force. Other than access to the FBI’s e-Guardian database, the FBI and Department of Homeland Security do not have a Memorandum of Understanding or other agreement to provide fusion centers with access to Joint Terrorist Task Force information. This was clearly a failure in communication. The Fusion Centers are to (8) serve as a point of contact to ensure the dissemination of information within the scope of the information sharing environment, including homeland security information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction information.” The CT Agent nor his supervisor believed this information had to be shared with local law enforcement as it was not substantial. The state and local authorities would have had to make the terrorist connection
first before they ran his name through the Guardian system. What were they thinking? That the Russians had made a mistake? CLOSING OF THE ASSESSMENT AND LETTERS TO THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT The FBI closed the assessment on June 24, 2011, having found no link or nexus between Tamerlan Tsarnaev and terrorism. The CT Agent’s supervisor (CT Supervisor) told the DOJ OIG that by indicating in the eGuardian system that the assessment found no nexus to terrorism he meant that the assessment found no nexus to terrorism from the time the assessment was opened to the time it was closed. He said that if after he closed the assessment the FBI received information from a foreign government suggesting a positive nexus, he would have reopened the assessment. The CT Supervisor wil later try to place to blame on his subordinate but he closed the case based on this flimsy investigation. He just offered a lot of double talk. The CT Supervisor told the DOJ OIG that he discussed the assessment with the CT Agent before the CT Supervisor decided to close it in order to determine whether any additional steps should be taken. He stated that he decided to send a letter to the FSB in an effort to obtain further information about Tsarnaev. In the disposition note in eGuardian, the CT Supervisor stated that the FBI would prepare a letter for the LEGAT office in Moscow to disseminate to the FSB. The CT Supervisor told the DOJ OIG that he probably instructed the CT Agent to draft the letter to
the FSB to request additional derogatory information about Tsarnaev because the information in the original lead information “wasn’t enough.” In retrospect it was more than enough. Did he expect the FSB to do his job for him, maybe col ect his pension? Accordingly, after the closing of the assessment, the LEGAT sent two letters to the FSB: one dated August 8, 2011, which stated that a review of FBI databases revealed no derogatory information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and erroneously characterized him as a former prosecutor in Kyrgyzstan; and one dated October 7, 2011, which corrected the earlier error and provided information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva developed during the assessment. Both letters requested that the FSB provide additional information in its possession regarding Tsarnaev. The DOJ and CIA OIGs determined that the Assistant Legal Attaché coordinated the August 8, 2011 letter with the CIA and documented this coordination, pursuant to an MOU between the two agencies. The DOJ and CIA OIGs did not find similar documentation that the LEGAT coordinated the October 7, 2011, letter with the CIA. The DOJ OIG found no documentation or other information that the FSB responded to either letter prior to the bombings. The FSB had given the FBI al the information it wished to transmit and letters stating that the FSB was wrong about Tsarnaev because he was an al -American boy could not convince FSB to cough up more info and endanger its sources. INCLUSION OF TSARNAEV ON THE TERRORIST WATCHLIST The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), known as the terrorist
watchlist, is the U.S. government’s central repository of records on known or suspected terrorists. The Terrorist Screening Database receives records from a classified database maintained by National Counterterrorism Center known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), and exports information to various unclassified downstream databases, including TECS. In September 2011, the FSB provided the CIA information on Tamerlan Tsarnaev that the OIGs determined was substantively identical to the information the FSB had provided the FBI in March 2011. On October 19, 2011, the CIA provided information obtained from the FSB to the National Counter Terrorism Center for watchlisting purposes, and to the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State for their information. Upon receipt of the information, National Counter Terrorism Center established a record for Tamerlan Tsarnaev in Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). Although there was insufficient derogatory information to establish reasonable suspicion that Tsarnaev was a known or suspected terrorist, (deleted) he was watchlisted. Once the CIA entered the tide began to change. The National Counterterrorism Center manages the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which serves as the U.S. government’s central repository of information on international terrorist identities as established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. TIDE supports the USG’s various terrorist screening systems or “watchlists” and the U.S. Intelligence Community’s overall counterterrorism mission. The CIA viewed him as more dangerous than did the FBI.
Tsarnaev's watchlist record also was entered into the Department of State Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), used to perform name checks on passport and visa applicants, and from December 2011
until March 2013, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) E- Selectee list, used for pre-flight travel screening. Under the practices in place during that time, the E-Selectee list included those admitted under the exception used for Tsarnaev. Records watch listed under the exception used for Tsarnaev subsequently were deemed ineligible for export to TSA and were removed. Who deemed them ineligible? Who removed them? It had to be the FBI not the CIA who put them there in the first place. It was the CT FBI SA who was determined to keep this terrorist on the street. At the same time, the National Counter Terrorism Center referred Tsarnaev's record to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF), an FBI-led task force that works to identify known or suspected international terrorists operating in the United States. In December 2011, a Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force analyst reviewed Tsarnaev's information, conducted database searches, and determined that the Boston Joint Terrorist Task Force previously had conducted an assessment of Tsarnaev based on the same information from the Russian government. The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force analyst also noted that the FBI LEGAT office in Moscow maintained an open case file on Tsarnaev. We are left hanging. Did the FTTTF close the case? Apparently not; as it checked with the LEGAT in Moscow. TSARNAEV’S TRAVEL TO RUSSIA On January 21, 2012, Tamerlan Tsarnaev traveled to Russia on an international flight from New York to Moscow. Customs and Border Protection received passenger data for Tsarnaev from the airline before
his travel and vetted it against various databases, including TECs. (DELETED) This vetting alerted a Customs and Border Patrol officer in Boston of Tsarnaev upcoming travel. (Deleted) Customs and Border Patrol receives advance airline passenger data prior to a flight's departure from or to the United States and checks that data repeatedly. The information available to the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ OIGs does not conclusively establish whether the Customs and Border Patrol Officer notified the FBI CT Agent about Tsarnaev's impending travel after being alerted to his travel. Searches of the Customs and Border Patrol Officer's and Counter Terrorism Agent's e- mail records provided to the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ OIGs did not produce any evidence that such notification occurred by e- mail communication. Further, during separate interviews, the Customs and Border Patrol Officer and the CT Agent each said that he had no specific recol ection of whether the Customs and Border Patrol Officer passed the travel information to the Counter Terrorism Agent. However, available information indicates that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer most likely notified the CT Agent of Tsarnaev's impending travel. Which is it? Did the Customs and Border Patrol Officer alert the CT Agent that Tsarnaev was going to Russia JUST AS THE RUSSIANS HAD PREDICTED HE WOULD. Of course he did and the CT Agent ignored it. I detect a pattern of behavior on the part of this CT Agent. The Customs and Border Patrol Officer told the DHS OIG that his usual process when he received a travel notification was to retrieve the TECS record and then inform the agent who requested the (deleted) e-mail, oral y, or by passing a "sticky note." At the time of Tsarnaev's travel to
Russia, Customs and Border Patrol and FBI policies did not specify the means by which such notifications should occur. Customs and Border Patrol has since changed its travel notification policy to require notification to the FBI case agent by email. The Customs and Border Patrol Officer said that he believes he fol owed his usual process in this instance and that the Counter Terrorism Agent would have told him that the lead was closed and that there was no interest in Tsarnaev's travel. The DHS OIG reviewed this Customs and Border Patrol Officer's TECS usage on the days preceding Tsarnaev's outbound travel and confirmed that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer accessed Tsarnaev's Joint Terrorist Task Force TECS record on the same day he was alerted of Tsarnaev's travel. Although this does not conclusively establish that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer also notified the CT Agent of Tsarnaev's outbound travel, the Department of Homeland Security OIG concluded that this confirmation demonstrates the Customs and Border Patrol Officer took action consistent with his usual process in response to the system alert. Further, the CT Agent stated that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer reliably passed along travel information concerning other subjects in the past, and he had no reason to doubt the Customs and Border Patrol Officer's statements that he believes he passed the notification of Tsarnaev's travel to the Counter Terrorism Agent in January. So what is the answer? Incompetence or an agenda to keep Tamerlane free so he could aid in the struggle for an Islamic Caucus Emirates. Tsarnaev was identified as a potential subject of interest for Customs and Border Patrol at JFK International Airport. On the evening of January 21, 2012, when Tsarnaev's flight was departing, he was a low
priority relative to the other passengers of potential concern. As a result, Customs and Border Patrol did not review his record or conduct an outbound inspection of him before he departed. Customs and Border Patrol had him on their watchlist but let him slip through their hands offering some lame excuse like they were too busy with other terrorists that night – the was probably a terrorist convention going on. MARCH 2012 JOINT TERRORIST TASK FORCE TECS RECORD The Customs and Border Patrol Officer who created the original Joint Terrorist Task Force TECS record configured the record to be visible to Customs and Border Patrol officers when they conduct initial inspection of international travelers arriving in the United States, known as primary inspection. The Customs and Border Patrol Officer included instructions in the Joint Terrorist Task Force TECS record that Customs and Border Patrol conduct a more intensive inspection of Tsarnaev, known as secondary inspection. TECS records are set to display during primary inspections for a certain period of time. At the end of this period, the Customs and Border Patrol officer may change the display status of the Joint Terrorist Task Force TECS record to be visible during primary inspection for as long as the individual continues to be of interest and merits additional scrutiny. In March 2012, the record's display status changed so that it would not display to Customs and Border Patrol personnel during primary inspection. Neither the Customs and Border Patrol Officer nor the CT Agent recal ed discussions about retaining the record to be visible
during primary inspection. However, the Customs and Border Patrol Officer told DHS OIG that his standard practice is to review the relevant record in TECS and to speak with the relevant case agent to determine whether the record's subject stil is of interest. Additional y, DHS OIG reviewed the Customs and Border Patrol Officer's TECS usage and confirmed that he accessed the Joint Terrorism Task Force TECS record three days after the display status changed. DHS OIG determined that although this does not conclusively establish that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer notified the CT Agent of the record's change in status, it suggests that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer took action consistent with his usual process to determine whether to change the record's display status. Border Patrol Officer told DHS OIG that his standard practice is to review the relevant record in TECS and to speak with the relevant case agent to determine whether the record's subject stil is of interest. So it was the CT/FBI agent that had Tsarnaev’s name removed. Are we dealing with a mole here? TSARNAEV RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES On July 17, 2012, Tsarnaev returned to the United States on an international flight from Moscow to New York. Customs and Border Patrol received passenger data for Tsarnaev from the airline (deleted) The Department of Homeland Security and DOJ OIGs were unable to determine whether the Customs and Border Patrol Officer alerted the CT Agent about Tsarnaev's inbound travel. The Customs and Border Patrol Officer told the Department of Homeland Security OIG that he did not remember receiving the alert or his actions in response to it, and the Counter Terrorism Agent told the DOJ OIG that he had no
recol ection of any discussions with the Customs and Border Patrol Officer about the return notification. Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security and DOJ OIGs did not locate an e-mail communication from the Customs and Border Patrol Officer to the CT Agent. Department of Homeland Security OIG reviewed the Customs and Border Patrol Officer's TECS usage, and confirmed that the Customs and Border Patrol Officer accessed Tsarnaev's Joint Terrorism Task Force TECS record a few hours after Tsarnaev's flight landed at JFK International Airport. The Customs and Border Patrol agent ran Tsarnaev though TECS and got a hit. Due to differences in Customs and Border Patrol procedures and the display status of the record, Tsarnaev was not identified as a potential subject of interest for Customs and Border Patrol at JFK International Airport. As a result, Tsarnaev was not directed to secondary inspection. The Customs and Border Patrol officer who conducted the primary inspection of Tsarnaev said he could not recal his encounter with Tsarnaev. But the CT Agent had arranged it so the reason for him being on the list would not display and he walked into the United States, one happy terrorist. A Customs and Border Patrol review of the officer’s activity indicates that the officer scanned Tsarnaev’s Alien Registration Card into the computer system used during primary inspection. The card was valid, and as a result, Customs and Border Patrol took Tsarnaev’s picture, col ected his fingerprints, confirmed his identity, and admitted him into the United States based on his LPR status.
Despite the FSB report that he was headed for Russia for terrorist training nothing popped up on him. Was someone manipulating the system? SIGNIFICANCE OF TSARNAEV’S TRAVEL FBI officials disagreed about the significance of Tsarnaev’s travel to Russia and whether it should have resulted in further investigative action. The CT Agent said that the travel would not have been significant because the assessment was closed and the FBI already had asked the Russians for additional derogatory information. When asked whether he would have considered taking further investigative steps had he learned of the travel at the time, the CT Agent said that he would not have done anything differently. This CT Agent never heard of reopening an investigation based on new information. Who is the CT Agent? Do his ancestors trace back to the Caucuses or is he a Muslim? However, other FBI officials stated that the information would have been important to the FBI. The CT Supervisor told the DOJ OIG that he was unaware of Tsarnaev’s travel to Russia until after the bombings, and that he would have expected the CT Agent to tel him in January 2012 about the TECS hit indicating that Tsarnaev was about to travel to Russia. The CT Agent said he did not recal having a practice of notifying his supervisor of travel notifications in closed assessments. The CT Agent was determined not to reopen the assessment. Why? Was the afraid of being second guessed or was there a more sinister motive. Something stinks. He said that had he known about the travel, he probably would have
reopened the assessment, interviewed Tsarnaev upon his departure from the United States, informed the LEGAT of the travel so that a determination could have been made about notifying the Russian government, and worked with the LEGAT to request information from the Russian government about Tsarnaev’s activities in Russia. The CT Supervisor also stated that “there is a very good chance” that the FBI would have interviewed Tsarnaev again upon his return from Russia had it known about the travel, but that this would have depended on what was learned from the Russians and from any secondary inspection during Tsarnaev’s travel. The CT Supervisor would have done a whole load of things had he known about the travel but the CI Agent kept it a secret from him to protect the future terrorist. Similarly, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) in charge of the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force during the period of the assessment expressed the belief to the DOJ OIG that if someone had “pinged” the CT Agent about Tsarnaev’s travel, it would have “changed everything.” We note, however, that the ASAC told the DOJ OIG that she was not made aware until after the Boston Marathon bombings of the Tsarnaev lead information or the FBI’s assessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The ASAC said that an assessment general y did not reach her attention unless it qualified as a sensitive investigative matter under the AG Guidelines. The FBI did not designate the Tsarnaev assessment as a sensitive investigative matter. It would have CHANGED EVERYTHING. There would have been no Boston Marathon Bombing had she gotten the slightest idea that the FSB prediction came true.
She also expressed the belief that had the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force known that Tsarnaev traveled to Russia, and that he went to an area known to be a training ground for extremists, it would have worked with the Moscow LEGAT to obtain additional information. So the mole kept the travel from the Joint Terrorist Task Force. Additional y, she said that she believes the FBI would have opened a second assessment and interviewed Tsarnaev about why he went to Russia. Of course the FBI would have it not been penetrated by a mole or someone with an anti-Russian agenda. The FBI LEGAT in Moscow between May 2011 and October 2012 told the DOJ OIG that he was not aware of Tsarnaev's travel to Russia at the time and did not believe that any U.S. agency at the Moscow Embassy was aware of the travel. The LEGAT characterized the travel as "huge" and said that had this information been brought to his attention, he would have reported the information to FBI Counterterrorism Division and the Boston Field Division for them to take any actions they deemed appropriate. He said that the "normal course of events" based on past cases would have been for the FBI to reopen the Guardian assessment and seek additional information from the FSB regarding Tsarnaev's activities while in Russia. The Legal Attaché is suspicious of the CT Agent. He said that there was something abnormal about the course of events generated by the CT Agent. TSAMAEV'S NATURALIZATION APPLICATION
Tamerlan Tsarnaev signed an application for naturalization on August 28, 2012. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services National Benefits Center (NBC), which conducts background checks to determine whether an applicant meets the requirements for naturalization, received the application on September 24, 2012. As part of its background checks, National Benefits Center searched TECS and identified the Joint Terrorism Task Force TECS record entered during the assessment, and also requested fingerprint and additional information from the FBI. Based on the information the National Benefits Center transferred Tsarnaev's application for additional review. The DHS OIG also reviewed the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services adjudications of the nationalization applications of the three other family members who applied, Anzor Tsarnaev, Dzhokhar Tsamaev, and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. Their files did not contain significant derogatory information. USCIS naturalized the three family members. On October 22, 2012, an Immigration Services Officer (ISO) sent an e mail to the CT Agent listed in the Joint Terrorism Task Force TECS record explaining that Tsarnaev had filed an application for naturalization and asking whether Tsarnaev represented a national security concern. The CT Agent subsequently searched the FBI's case management database and replied on October 23, 2012, to the Immigration Services Officer, "There is no national security concern related to [Tamerlan Tsarnaev] and nothing that I know of that should preclude issuance of whatever is being applied for." Same agent in same role giving a carte blanche for Tamerlan even though he knew that Tamerlan had traveled to Russia just as the FSB predicted he would.
The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that he did not recal whether he searched public sources before replying to this e-mail. The FBI has no procedures for processing such requests for information about the subjects of closed investigations or assessments that are submitted to the FBI in connection with naturalization applications. There was no open case on Tamerlane since the CT Agent had hidden his travel to Russia and the investigation and assessment had been closed. The CT Agent didn’t do squat not even running his name through Google. The Immigration Services Officer also contacted the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services liaison on the Boston JTTF. The liaison told the DHS OIG that when he received the Immigration Services Officer’s e-mail, he conducted database searches and met with the CT Agent. He said that he and the CT Agent discussed the records from the assessment of Tsarnaev, including the original information provided by the FSB. The liaison said that he told the CT Agent that barring any derogatory information from this case or another source, Tsarnaev likely was eligible for citizenship, and that he recal ed that the CT Agent had no opposition to Tsarnaev’s naturalization. Barring any derogatory information from this case or another source” the Russian travel was derogatory information. The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that it was a “good bet” he discussed Tsarnaev’s naturalization application with the liaison but did not have a specific recol ection of what they discussed. “I don’t remember.” Better to say that than to lie. On October 26, 2012, the liaison sent an e-mail to the ISO stating that
there was no current or prior investigation for Tsarnaev, and “there is no derogatory information related to national security that would adversely affect the subject’s eligibility for the immigration benefit being sought at this time.” He could not have received this information from the CT Agent and must have become confused as the CT Agent had conducted the prior investigation. Tsarnaev’s application then was returned to the queue for normal processing. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services personnel subsequently conducted database searches for Tamerlan Tsarnaev on multiple separate dates and found no derogatory records. DHS OIG determined that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services personnel did not use al available aliases when conducting these searches, failing to query for the term “Tamer Tsarnayev.” However, the DHS OIG concluded that had United States Citizenship and Immigration Services checked this alias, it would not have produced additional information. CT Agent had sanitized the terrorist traces. In late November 2012, in response to a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services information request, the FBI conducted a database search and drafted a memorandum stating that there was no derogatory information about Tsarnaev. On December 3, 2012, the FBI returned additional information results showing Tsarnaev’s arrest for assault and battery of his former girlfriend in July 2009. USCIS then requested court records to confirm that the arrest did not result in a conviction, which it did not receive before the April 15, 2013, bombings.
A United States Citizenship and Immigration Services officer interviewed Tsarnaev on January 23, 2013, but did not adjudicate his naturalization after the interview because the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services had not received the court records relating to his 2009 arrest. As a result, Tsarnaev’s naturalization application remained pending on April 15, 2013. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services officer told the DHS OIG that had the court records been processed before this date, he would have had no grounds to deny the application, and Tsarnaev would have become a naturalized citizen. It was not the report of terrorism that held back his naturalization but a domestic violence case. The CT Agent had access to this arrest information yet failed to factor Tamerlane’s violence into the equation. V. INFORMATION OBTAINED OR FIRST ACCESSED AND REVIEWED AFTER THE BOMBINGS The OIG teams examined information that existed prior to the bombings but was not obtained or first accessed and reviewed until after the bombings. This information included certain (Deleted) to show that Tsarnaev intended to pursue jihad, statements by Tsarnaev’s former girlfriend describing Tsarnaev's shift toward radical Islam between 2006 and 2009, descriptions from multiple sources of Tsarnaev's activities while in Russia in 2012, and Tsarnaev's col ection and sharing of jihadi-themed videos and other extremist materials beginning at least a year prior to the bombings. Al of this was overlooked by CT Agent X. This goes way beyond sloppy
tradecraft. Something else is happening here which the FBI wil never reveal. January 2011 Communications (Deleted) INTERVIEW OF TSARNAEV'S WIFE AND FORMER GIRLFRIEND After the bombings the FBI interviewed Tsarnaev's former girlfriend and his wife, Katherine Tsarnaeva. The former girlfriend provided information about changes in Tsarnaev's behavior and appearance between 2006 and 2009, including his growing interest in videos about Islam. (deleted) The DOJ OIG concluded that Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s former girlfriend and wife were available to be interviewed during the 2011 assessment, but that it can never be known whether they would have provided the same information to the FBI about Tsarnaev at any time before Tsarnaev had been identified as a perpetrator of the Boston Marathon bombings while he was stil alive and, in the case of Tsarnaev's wife, while he was married to her. These were the subjects that should have been interviewed first, then the suspected terrorists should have been interviewed but CT Agent was intent on closing this investigation. TSAMAEV'S TRAVEL TO RUSSIA Tsarnaev traveled to Russia on January 21, 2012 and returned to the United States on July 17, 2012. The DOJ OIG found that no information was available in the FBI's primary data systems prior to the bombings about Tsarnaev's activities in Russia, and sought to determine what additional information existed about Tsarnaev's activities during this
period and whether this information was available to the FBI before the bombings. Was CT Agent hoping that Tsarnaev would commit terrorist act there against the Russians? Or was CT Agent a mole who was going to facilitate the Boston Marathon bombing or was he someone who was hired to fil a racial or religious quota? Or was he just downright stupid? The DOJ OIG's review of materials provided by the FBI showed that after the bombings the FBI obtained information about Tsarnaev's activities during this period primarily from three sources: the FSB, witness interviews , and analyses of computer media from Tsarnaev's home obtained through a method only available in a full investigation. These materials showed that Tsarnaev spoke of jihad prior to traveling to Russia, and that he shared extremist articles and videos while he was in Russia. The FBI covered up his terrorist connections in Russia so as not to add insult to injury. COMPUTER MEDIA AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS The OIGs reviewed analyses of relevant information learned from exploiting the electronic media and communications of Tsarnaev and his associates after the bombings. The FBI's analysis was based in part on other government agency information showing that Tsarnaev created a YouTube account on August 17, 2012, and began posting the first of several jihadi-themed videos in approximately October 2012. The FBI's analysis was based in part on open source research and analysis conducted by other U.S. government agencies shortly after the
bombings showing that Tsarnaev's YouTube account was created with the profile name "Tamerlan Tsarnaev." After reviewing a draft of this report , the FBI commented that Tsarnaev's YouTube display name changed from "muazseyfullah" to "Tamerlan Tsarnaev" on or about February 12, 2013, and suggested that therefore Tsarnaev's YouTube account could not be located using the search term "Tamerlan Tsarnaev" before that date. In response to a DOJ OIG request for information supporting this statement, the FBI produced a heavily redacted 3-page excerpt from an unclassified March 19, 2014, Electronic Communication analyzing information that included information about Tsarnaev's YouTube account. The unredacted portion of the Electronic Communication stated that YouTube e-mail messages sent to Tsarnaev's Google e-mail account were addressed to "muazseyfullah" (a tribute to Emir Muaz, an Islamic separatist that operated in Russia’s southern Dagestan republic until he was kil ed by Russian forces in 2009.) prior to February 12, 2013, and to "Tamerlan Tsarnaev" beginning on February 14, 2013. The FBI redacted other information in the Electronic Communication about Tsarnaev's YouTube and Google e-mail accounts. The DOJ OIG concluded that because another government agency was able to locate Tsarnaev's YouTube account through open source research shortly after the bombings, the FBI likely would have been able to locate this information through open source research between February 12, 2013 and April 15, 2013. The DOJ OIG could not determine whether open source queries prior to that date would have revealed Tsarnaev to be the individual who posted this material. Al the CT Agent had to do was do a simple Google search to locate this material.
An FBI analysis of electronic media showed that the computers used by Tsarnaev contained a substantial amount of jihadist articles and videos, including material written by or associated with U.S.-born radical Islamic cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi. On one such computer, the FBI found at least seven issues of Inspire, an on-line English language magazine created by al Aulaqi. One issue of this magazine contained an article entitled, "Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom," which included instructions for building the explosive devices used in the Boston Marathon bombings. Information learned through the exploitation of the Tsarnaev's computers was obtained through a method that may only be used in the course of a full investigation, which the FBI did not open until after the bombings. NSA INFORMATION The DOJ OIG, in coordination with the Intel igence Community Inspector General, reviewed information that the NSA produced in response to a request from the Intel igence Community Inspector General. Included in this production was information from 2012 (deleted) The information concerned (deleted) This information was not accessed or reviewed until after the bombing. (deleted) VI. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS Based on al the information gathered during our coordinated review, we believe that the FBI, CIA, DHS, and National Counter Terrorism Center general y shared information and fol owed procedures appropriately. We identified a few areas where broader information sharing between agencies may have been required, such as FBI
coordination with the CIA after receiving the lead information in March 20 or where broader information sharing in the future should be considered, such as greater sharing of threat information with state and local partners. We also identified a factual question that could not be conclusively resolved concerning whether the notification of Tsarnaev's travel to Russia was shared with the FBI CT Agent who conducted the assessment. With respect to the FBI's pre-bombing investigation, we concluded that the FBI made investigative judgments based on information known at the time and that were within the legal framework governing its ability to gather intel igence and conduct investigations, in this case of U.S. persons. We believe it is impossible to know what would have happened had different judgments been made. With respect to post- assessment activities, we believe that Tsarnaev's travel to Russia in 2012 was significant in view of the FSB lead information and warranted further investigative action. Each participating OIG reached specific conclusions regarding actions taken or not taken by its component agencies. We briefly summarize our most significant conclusions below. THE FBI'S ASSESSMENT OF TAMERLAN TSAMAEV • The AG Guidelines and the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide give flexibility to FBI personnel to choose a lower level of investigation, even when the factual predication for a higher level of investigation is met, if FBI personnel determine the matter can be resolved through less intrusive methods. Given the limited information available to the Boston JTTF in March 20 concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the DOJ OIG concluded that the FBI CT Supervisor and CT Agent's
decision to open the investigation at the assessment level was an application of the least intrusive method principle within their investigative discretion. Why choose the least intrusive method in a terrorism case? It appears as if the CT Agent convinced the CT Supervisor to do so. • Because the lead from the FSB included information about Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, the DOJ OIG believes that the CT Supervisor and CT Agent should have given greater consideration to opening an assessment on her. However, given that the bulk of the derogatory information in the lead arguably focused on Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the DOJ OIG concluded that it was within their discretion not to open an assessment on Zubeidat Tsarnaeva and instead to conduct limited database queries using her name and other relevant identifiers. Zubeidat Tsarnaeva was interviewed but no investigation was opened on her. It was within the discretion of the agents to do this so they real y didn’t mess up afteral . • The DOJ OIG concluded that additional investigative steps would have resulted in a more thorough assessment, including conducting additional database searches, asking questions of Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his parents to elicit information about any plans Tsarnaev may have had to travel to Russia, and interviewing Tsarnaev’s former girlfriend and wife. However, the DOJ OIG determined that the additional database searches would not have revealed any information that was not already known to the CT Agent conducting the assessment. In addition, the DOJ OIG found that it is impossible to know what the former girlfriend and wife would have told the FBI in 2011 before the Boston Marathon bombings and while Tamerlan Tsarnaev was stil alive.
Therefore, it cannot be known whether these additional interviews would have yielded additional information relevant to the FSB lead information. They are giving the CT Agent the benefit of the doubt. Of course it is impossible to go back into the past in a time machine and conduct this investigation but judging from the carnage at the Boston Marathon it was a tragic mistake or the work of someone with an agenda. TAMERLAN TSARNAEV’S TRAVEL TO RUSSIA • The DOJ and DHS Office of Inspector Generals found that there is a factual question regarding whether the DHS Customs and Border Patrol Officer on the Boston JTTF, after receiving advance notification of the travel, informed the FBI CT Agent who conducted the assessment about Tsarnaev’s flight to Russia. The OIGs believe that the CT Agent most likely did receive notice of Tsarnaev’s outbound flight but we were unable to determine this fact conclusively because there was no written confirmation that the CBP Officer had conveyed this information to the CT Agent. For the same reason, the DOJ and DHS OIGs could not determine conclusively whether the Customs and Border Patrol Officer informed the CT Agent of Tsarnaev’s return flight from Russia. He might have missed informing the CT Agent once but twice – forget it. The CT Agent buried the information either to prevent the errors in his investigation from surfacing or for more sinister reasons. • The DOJ OIG agreed with the CT Supervisor and ASAC that Tsarnaev's travel to Russia was significant and warranted further investigation. Therefore, assuming the CT Agent was aware of Tsarnaev's impending travel, we believe that he should have taken the
additional investigative steps the CT Supervisor said he probably would have taken had he known about the travel. We note, however, that it is impossible to know what additional information may have surfaced through further investigation, including information obtained or accessed during the course of the FBI 's ful investigations initiated after the bombings. Same time machine stupidity. CBP Vetting of Tsamaev's Travel • DHS OIG examined whether Custom and Border Patrol vetted Tsarnaev's outbound travel to Russia according to policies and procedures and determined that it did so. DHS OIG determined that the Custom and Border Patrol's system for vetting passenger information performed as designed, and identified Tsarnaev as a potential subject of interest. Additional y, DHS OIG examined Custom and Border Patrol's decision not to conduct an outbound inspection of Tsarnaev and concluded that Custom and Border Patrol's decision to scrutinize higher priority travelers instead of Tsarnaev accorded with Custom and Border Patrol policy and procedures. Tsarnaev’s file had been sanitized by the CT Agent so you cannot blame CBP. • The DHS OIG determined that the CBP Officer's decision to al ow Tsarnaev's JTTF TECS record to change display status and therefore not be visible to Custom and Border Patrol personnel during primary inspection when he returned to the United States, was in accordance with Custom and Border Patrol policy and procedures. Under Custom and Border Patrol policy, the Custom and Border Patrol Officer may
change the display status of the TECS records to be visible as long as the individual continues to be of interest and merits additional scrutiny. The DHS and DOJ OIGs believe that Custom and Border Patrol and FBI should clarify when and under what circumstances JTTF personnel may change the display status of a TECS record, particularly in closed cases. He al owed the TECS record to change status – it was the CT Agent who changed it. • DHS OIG determined that Custom and Border Patrol properly admitted Tsarnaev into the United States in July 2012 after taking Tsarnaev's picture, col ecting his fingerprints, and confirming his identity and LPR status. DHS OIG also concluded that CBP's notification to the Custom and Border Patrol Officer of Tsarnaev's inbound travel was in compliance with Custom and Border Patrol procedures. • CBP has taken steps since the bombing to improve the vetting process in light of lessons it learned. So it is CBP that is responsible not the CT Agent. Information Sharing and Coordination Between the FBI and CIA • The DOJ and CIA OIGs found that the FBI LEGAT in Moscow did not coordinate with the CIA in March 2011, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and the CIA, after receiving the lead information from the FSB concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev. However, we also concluded that the CIA’s involvement in March 2011 likely would not have provided the FBI with information that could have been helpful to the Boston JTTF’s assessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev. FTTTF and NCTC’s handling of information about Tsarnaev
• The DOJ OIG examined the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force’s handling of the referral of Tsarnaev’s record from The National Counterterrorism Center, including the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force’s decision not to provide information about the fact of the closed FBI assessment of Tsarnaev to The National Counterterrorism Center. The DOJ OIG determined that the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force practice at that time did not require the provision of information directly to The National Counterterrorism Center. Additional y, the DOJ OIG concluded that had the fact of the closed assessment been shared with The National Counterterrorism Center, this information may have led to Tsarnaev’s removal from the watchlist. • The National Counterterrorism Center had in its possession the CIA’s nomination of Tsarnaev to TIDE, the TIDE record derived from that nomination, and travel data from DHS regarding Tamerlan “Taarnaev’s” outbound flight to Russia in January 2012. • The IC IG determined that Tsarnaev’s nomination to TIDE was at a lower priority than those that are ordinarily enhanced. The IC IG expects The National Counterterrorism Center’s new practice of seeking to enhance al U.S. persons watchlisted information in TIDE wil reduce the level of unmatched records for those persons in the future. • On April 3, 2012, The National Counterterrorism Center received information from DHS about Tsarnaev’s January 21, 2012, outbound travel. The data did not correctly identify Tsarnaev as a U.S. person. Based on the information received from DHS, The National Counterterrorism Center retained the document in accordance with procedures. Had the data accurately identified Tsarnaev as a lawful permanent resident (a U.S. person), The National Counterterrorism
Center would have been required to delete his travel information within 180 days unless it was determined to constitute terrorism information. Adjudication of Immigration Benefits for Tamerlan Tsarnaev • DHS OIG examined the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service’s adjudication of Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s 2012 application for naturalization and concluded that, with one exception, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) conducted the naturalization processes in accordance with the requirements of the INA and the USCIS policies and procedures. The one exception was that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service did not check one alias, “Tamer Tsarnayev.” However, the DHS OIG determined that had the USCIS checked this alias, it would not have found the TECS entries derived from Tsarnaev’s watchlist record. • DHS OIG found that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service acted appropriately by contacting Boston JTTF members and receiving information that Tsarnaev did not pose a national security concern. Additional y, the ISO who interviewed Tsarnaev fol owed USCIS processes and policies by delaying adjudication of his naturalization application until the court records dismissing criminal al egations were obtained.